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Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831 (2008).
LAW: The Federal Tort Claims Act exception to waiver of
immunity in Section 2680(c) covers all law enforcement
officers.
FACTS: Petitioner was a federal prisoner who was
transferred from a United States Penitentiary in Atlanta,
Georgia to a United States Penitentiary in Inez, Kentucky.
The Petitioner left two duffle bags containing personal
property to be shipped to the new penitentiary. Upon arrival,
Petitioner noticed that several items of personal property that
were of religious and nostalgic significance were missing.
Petitioner filed an administrative tort claim, which was denied.
Petitioner then filed a complaint alleging violations of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP). The BOP maintained that the Petitioner's claim was
barred by the exception in section 2680(c) for property claims
against law enforcement officers. The District Court agreed
and dismissed the Petitioner's FTCA claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appealed and the Eleventh
Circuit joined five other Courts of Appeals in construing the
clause to encompass all law enforcement officers. This court
granted certiorari because five other Courts of Appeals
reached a contrary conclusion by interpreting the clause as
limited to officers performing customs or excise functions.
ANALYSIS: Petitioner contended that the clause in section
2680(c) applied only to law enforcement officers enforcing
customs or excise laws and therefore does not affect the
waiver of sovereign immunity for his property claim against
the BOP officers. The court was not persuaded by the
Petitioner's attempt to create ambiguity where the statute's
structure and text suggested none. The court reasoned that
Congress' use of "any" to modify "other law enforcement
officer" was most naturally read to mean law enforcement
officers of whatever kind. The court stated that the text
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indicated that Congress intended to preserve immunity for
claims arising from the detention of property and that there
was no indication of any intent that immunity for those claims
turned on the type of law being enforced. The court also
referenced a prior amendment to section 2680(c) to support its
conclusion that Congress' view that section 2680(c) covered
all law enforcement officers. Under subsection (1), an
amendment restored the sovereign immunity waiver for
officers enforcing any federal forfeiture law. Against the
textural and structural evidence, the court concluded that
Congress intended the exception to waiver of immunity
applied to all law enforcement officers.
HOLDING: The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's
judgment that section 2680(c) covers all law enforcement
officers was affirmed.
IMPACT: This clarification of "any other law enforcement
officer" confirms the broad scope and application to the
exception to waiver of immunity under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. All law enforcement officers are exempt from
waiver of immunity.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT
Nat'l Mining Assoc. v. Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
LAW: Chevron deference applies to the Secretary of the
Interior's interpretation of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.
FACTS: In 1977, Congress passed the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA") in order to protect
society and the environment from adverse effects of surface
mining operations. SMCRA authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to prohibit surface coal mining if it was a federal land
and it was determined that the land was unsuitable for that
purpose. Section 522 (e) bans surface mining in statutorily
designated areas after August 3, 1977 and subject to valid
existing rights ("VER"). For decades, the Secretary and the
courts have struggled to understand VER and what it protects.
In 1999, the Secretary promulgated a rule through notice-and-
comment procedures offering another interpretation of VER.
The rule set forth two requirements for a miner claiming VER
protection. First, he must produce a legally binding document
that vested the right to mine the land. Second, he must prove
that the owner of the land had obtained all of the necessary
mining permits before the August 3, 1977 deadline or else
prove all of the coal adjacent to an existing surface mining
operation was needed to ensure the economic viability of the
operation as a whole.
The National Mining Association ("NMA") challenged the
rule arguing that the Secretary's interpretation was too narrow
and shielded more land from mining than Congress intended.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
found the Secretary's interpretation as reasonable and entered
judgment for the Secretary. The NMA appealed.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected NMA's argument that
because the history of the Act's interpretation struggles means
that the agency's current policy is entitled to less deference
because it has changed over time. The court reasoned that the
exact opposite is true. Since Congress had presented such a
wide range of plausible interpretations to an agency with
rulemaking authority, it showed delegation of the power to
make reasonable adjustments to the nation's surface mining
policy.
The court agreed that the SMCRA language makes VER an
ambiguous phrase. NMA argued that the word "right" could
be taken to mean a property right, but the court stated that it
could also encompass a narrower protection, as in the 1999
rule. Since the court was convinced that VER was ambiguous,
they had to defer to the Secretary's interpretation so long as it
was based on a permissible construction of the statute and was
a reasonable interpretation. The court found that the 1999
Rule was true to the authority delegated to protect against the
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harmful effects of surface mining and therefore it was not
surprising that the rule cut against the interests of some miners.
Next, NMA argued that the 1999 Rule runs afoul of both the
Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment and
therefore invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance. The
court stated that the judiciary must presume that Congress acts
consistent with its duty to uphold the Constitution and must
make every effort to construe statutes as to find their
constitutional foundations. The canon of constitutional
avoidance will trump Chevron deference if an interpretation
presents serious constitutional difficulties and not because of
the mere mention of a constitutional problem. In regards to
due process argument, the court reasoned that because
Congress created no process to abide in denial based on
prohibition of surface mining in sensitive areas for all but
those who had valid existing rights, there was no process for
NMA to argue it was denied. In regards to the takings
argument, the court stated that a taking is unconstitutional only
when the government fails to pay just compensation. Here, the
miners can pursue their takings claims in Federal Claims Court
for protection. Therefore, NMA's takings challenge raises no
serious question about the 1999 Rule that would preclude
Chevron deference.
HOLDING: The district court's judgment giving Chevron
deference to the Secretary's interpretive rule was affirmed.
IMPACT: In order for a miner to obtain VER protection that
will allow for surface mining in prohibited areas, he must meet
the two requirements set forth by the Secretary of the Interior's
1999 interpretive rule. This rule narrows the application of
VER protection.
New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
LAW: The plain text of section 112 of 42 USCS § 7412
requires the Administrator to have specific findings based on
studies before delisting any source of hazardous air pollutant
("HAP").
FACTS: In 1970, Congress added section 112 to the Clean
Air Act ("CAA"), which required the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to list hazardous air pollutants
("HAPs") that should be regulated because they cause or
contribute to an increase in serious irreversible illnesses or
cause mortality. Over the next eighteen years, the EPA only
listed eight HAPs and established standards for seven. In
1990, Congress became concerned about the slow pace of the
EPA's regulations and altered section 112 to eliminate much
of the EPA's discretion in the process. First, Congress
required the EPA to regulate more than one hundred specific
HAPs and imposed strict pollution control requirements on
both new and existing sources of HAPs. Second, Congress
restricted the opportunities for the EPA and others to intervene
in the regulation of HAP sources. Specifically, the EPA could
delete any source category from the HAP list added by
Congress only after determining that emissions from no source
in the category or subcategory exceeded a level adequate to
protect public health. Parties could not challenge the
Administrator's decision to add pollutants to the list until the
Administrator issued emission standards for such pollutant.
Third, Congress also required the Administrator to evaluate
regulatory options with care and to meet certain conditions
before listing electric utility steam generating units ("EGUs")
as a HAP source. This required the Administrator to perform
studies and to regulate as appropriate and necessary after
evaluation of the results of the studies.
In December 2000, the EPA concluded that it was "appropriate
and necessary" to regulate mercury emissions from coal- and
oil-fired power plants under section 112 and listed these EGUs
as sources of HAPs regulated under that section. In 2005, after
reconsidering its previous determination, the EPA purported to
remove these EGUs from the section 112 list. Thereafter it
promulgated Clean Air Mercury Rule ("CAMR").
In early 2004, the EPA proposed two regulatory alternatives to
control emissions from coal and oil fired EGUs. The first rule
removes coal and oil fired EGUs from the list of sources
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whose emissions are regulated under section 112 of the CAA.
The second rule sets performance standards for new coal-fired
EDUs and establishes total mercury emissions limits for States
along with a cap-and-trade system. Although the EPA was
attempting to delist EGUs without making the findings
required, the EPA explained it had the authority because their
regulation as neither appropriate nor necessary because the
emission reductions could be achieved under CAMR
promulgated by the EPA.
New Jersey and fourteen additional states, the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality, the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection, the City of
Baltimore, and various environmental organizations
("Environmental Petitioners") challenged the validity of the
two rules promulgated by the EPA.
ANALYSIS: The Environmental Petitioners contended that
the EPA violated section 112's plain text and structure when it
did not comply with the requirements in delisting the EGUs.
The court agreed by stating that the only was the EPA could
delist an EGU was by satisfying the section's study
requirements and the EPA concedes that it never made the
findings. Therefore, the EPA had violated the plain text and
must be rejected. The court rejected EPA's argument that
deference should be given for evading the requirements
because of ambiguity. The court found no persuasive evidence
that the plain text was ambiguous to allow deference.
The EPA also argued that it had the inherent authority to
reverse an earlier administrative determination or ruling where
an agency has a principled basis for doing so and prior to the
EPA's listing of EGUs under section 112, nothing in the CAA
would have prevented it from reversing its determination. The
court rejected this argument because Congress can limit an
agency's discretion to reverse itself. Congress had done just
that by unambiguously limiting the EPA's discretion to
remove sources, including EGUs, from the list once they had
been added.
The court also rejected the EPA's argument that it had
previously removed sources from the list without satisfying the
requirements, because previous statutory violations could not
excuse the one before the court now.
Also, the Environmental Petitioners contended that CAMR is
inconsistent with the provisions of section 112 of the CAA.
The court agreed because the EPA promulgated the CAMR
regulations on the basis that there would be no section 112
regulation of EGU emissions and that the new source
performance standards would be accompanied by a national
emissions cap and a voluntary cap-and-trade program. Given
that these assumptions were incorrect, the court must vacate
the CAMR's new source performance standards and remand
them to the EPA for reconsideration. The court emphasized
that severance and affirmance of a portion of a regulation is
improper if there is substantial doubt that the agency would
have adopted the severed portion on its own.
HOLDING: The court held that the EPA had no authority to
delist coal and oil fired utility units without following the
CAA delisting provisions. Petitions were granted and rules
vacated.
IMPACT: Deference is not given to an agency when the
plain text of a regulation is not ambiguous. When challenged
regulations fail to comply with the plain meaning, the court
will invalidate the rule and all subsequent rules that were
based on the vacated rule will also be vacated in whole, unless
there is no substantial doubt that the agency would have
adopted the severed portion alone.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - NINTH CIRUIT
Gonzales v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.
2007).
LAW: An agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute
binds courts that have previously ruled inconsistent to it.
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FACTS: In 1994, Congress amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA") to provide for a special adjustment of
status for certain aliens from certain admissibility requirements
for adjustment of status. It allowed the Attorney General to
adjust the status of an alien who entered the United States
without inspection to that of a legal permanent resident if: 1)
the alien was admissible to the United States and the
beneficiary of an immediately available immigrant visa; and 2)
paid an application fee fives times the usual fee. In 1996,
Congress enhanced the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). In addition to the
adjustment provision, there were two IIRIRA provisions
pertaining to aliens who reenter the United States after being
previously removed or deported - the reinstatement provision
and the inadmissibility provision. The reinstatement provision
provides for automatic reinstatement of an alien's prior
removal or deportation order when the alien has entered the
United States illegally and may not apply for relief. The
inadmissible provision permanently deems inadmissible a
previously removed alien who enters illegally, unless he has
been absent from the United States for more than ten years,
and he has the consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security
to the application for readmission. Application is done with
and 1-212 form which, if accepted, provides a waiver to the
inadmissibility factor.
In August 2004, the Ninth Circuit held in Perez-Gonzalez v.
Ascroft that a previously removed alien unlawfully present in
the United States was eligible to adjust his status under the
adjustment provision so long as he filed an 1-212 waiver
application prior to the initiation of the reinstatement
proceedings. This was notwithstanding the bar to relief from
the inadmissibility and reinstatement provisions of the IIRIRA.
Plaintiffs are seven Mexicans who were previously deported
from the United States and have reentered without permission.
Each applied for 1-212 waivers, which were denied. Plaintiffs'
claim that they have been denied the opportunity to apply for
lawful permanent resident status because of the Defendant's
refusal to comply with the precedent decision by the Ninth
Circuit. The district court issued an order granting the motions
for injunctive relief to the class of aliens, which enjoined the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") from denying
certain applications for permission to reapply for admission
into the United States or from acting on any denied
applications. DHS appealed.
ANALYSIS: The court first addressed DHS's contention that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the
injunction. The court agreed with the Plaintiffs and found that
the district court did not err by concluding that the injunction's
effect on reinstatement proceedings is one step removed from
the relief sought by Plaintiffs and therefore does not bring the
action with the INA bar. The court also rejected DHS's
contention that the Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. It stated the exhaustion was not
required because no statute or rule mandates administrative
review of the denial of adjustment of status, therefore statutory
exhaustion was not required in this case. Additionally, the
stated that the case presents a question of law that would not
be aided by further development of the record.
The court rejected DHS's argument that the district court erred
in not concluding that the Fernandez- Vargas case holding
undermines the Perez-Gonzalez v. Ascroft case because the
cases raised different issues and issues not raised or discussed
are unstated assumptions and not precedential holdings. The
court agreed with DHS that the district court erred by failing to
defer to Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") opinion in the
case In re Torres-Garcia, which undermines the Perez-
Gonzalez holding pertaining to an illegal reentrant's
admissibility. Since the court's holding in Perez-Gonzalez
was based on a finding of statutory ambiguity, the court is
bound by the agency's interpretation of applicable statutes,
even though they are inconsistent with the court's holding in
Perez-Gonzalez. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs had no likelihood
of success on the merits of their suit and the preliminary
injunction was vacated.
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HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
order and remanded for proceedings consistent with the
opinion.
IMPACT: Courts are bound by an agency's reasonable
interpretation of statutes, even when they have previously held
inconsistently to it. Rather than adhere to a court's prior
precedent, an agency's subsequent interpretation rules.
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836 (9t' Cir.
2007).
LAW: It is not an abuse of discretion when a district court
issues a partial injunction because it provides an equitable
solution if it does not cause further irreparable harm.
FACTS: Although farmers and ranchers generally had
surface rights, the federal government owned most of the
subsurface mineral rights in the Powder River Basin. The
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") administers the
mineral resources owned by the federal government. For more
than twenty years, BLM has had resource management plans
for the area. In 2002, BLM together with the Montana Board
of Oil and Gas Conservation and the Montana Department of
Environmental Quality issued a draft environmental impact
statement analyzing development of coal bed methane
resources and made it available for public review and
comment. The draft environmental impact statement analyzed
five alternatives. This statement was challenged by the
Plaintiffs, who include: the federal Environmental Protection
Agency, the Montana Department of Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, an advocacy group called the Northern Plains Resource
Council, and the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Indians. The
Plaintiffs suggested that BLM should study another
alternative, which they called "phased development."
The final environmental impact statement approved existing
oil and gas leases pursuant to an earlier resource management
plan from 1994. This plan included the rights to explore and
develop coal bed methane. The statement also stated that the
time for challenging the 1994 decision had passed.
The district court concluded that the final environmental
impact statement was generally sufficient under the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), but improperly failed to
consider the "phased development" alternative proposed by the
Plaintiffs. Accordingly, if partially enjoined coal bed methane
development. The injunction prohibited development on 93%
of the resource area until BLM completed a revised
environmental impact statement, but permitted development
on 7% of the resource area subject to site-specific review.
Both sides appealed.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the Plaintiffs argument that
the district court should have enjoined all development
because the final environmental impact statement mistakenly
failed to consider the phased development alternative. The
court stated that it was bound by precedent to hold that a
NEPA violation is subject to traditional standards in equity for
injunctive relief and does not require an automatic blanket
injunction. Rather the court must review the scope of the
injunction for abuse of discretion.
The court went on to discuss how a district court has broad
latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary to
remedy an established wrong and that the district court would
have violated established precedent if it had of issued the
blanket injunction. The court discussed how courts must apply
the usual equitable factors in determining the scope of an
injunction pending NEPA compliance.
The court then addressed the tribal claims that the Plaintiffs
argued were dismissed by the district court in err. In a de novo
review, the court did not need to reach the merits or the claim
that the resource management plan will adversely affect Indian
cultural resources, because neither the plan nor the partial
injunction could affect them since no actual development is
possible without additional environmental assessment. BLM
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conceded that the Tribe is free to bring an action challenging
any site-specific leasing decision at a later time.
HOLDING: The district court's judgment issuing a partial
injunction was not an abuse of discretion and was affirmed.
IMPACT: District courts have broad latitude in fashioning
equitable relief. Since irreparable harm is not presumed,
partial injunctions provide remedy while awaiting additional
assessments.
Yetiv v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 503 F.3d 1087(9th Cir. 2007).
LAW: An agency generally does not lose jurisdiction over a
claim for money penalties because of the post-violation actions
of the violator.
FACTS: The United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") imposed penalties on Yetiv for failure
to provide HUD with audited annual financial statements
relating to the operation of a multifamily housing project,
which were required because it was purchased with a HUD-
insured loan. Yetiv was additionally subject to the Civil
Money Penalty statute 12 U.S.C. §1735f-15, which authorizes
HUD to impose civil penalties against multi-family
mortgagors who "knowingly and materially" commit certain
violations. Failing to provide the annual audited financial
statements was such a violation. Yetiv appealed to the
Secretary of HUD, who adopted the administrative law judge's
("AL") decision without change. Yetiv sought review of the
administrative decision.
ANALYSIS: In de novo review, the court had to determine
whether HUD's decision to impose civil penalties was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law. The court rejected Yetiv's argument
that HUD lacked jurisdiction to impose civil penalties because
he pre-paid the HUD-insured loan prior to final adjudication.
The court reasoned that the general rule is that liability for
civil penalties attaches at the time of the violation. If the court
accepted Yetiv's argument, the practical effect would be to
encourage mortgagors to forgo the expense of compliance and
pay the loan off before adjudication to escape liability. Paying
the loan early did not deprive HUD of jurisdiction to maintain
the enforcement action and impose penalties.
The court also rejected Yetiv's characterization of himself as a
victim in a vendetta. The court reasoned that collection of
penalties serves a deterrent purpose and discourages other
mortgagors from failing to file audited financial statements.
The court was also not persuaded by Yetiv's argument that the
imposition of penalties was arbitrary and capricious because
the ALJ used an illogical standard for determining whether the
violations were "material." Although the court agreed that
some of the factors used in the "totality of the circumstances"
test had no logical relationship to the significance of the
underlying violation, the ALJ carefully based his decision on
two factors that do logically relate to materiality: the injury to
public, and the fact that Yetiv benefited economically from his
violations. Therefore, the ALJ's decision was not arbitrary or
capricious. Finally, the court was also not persuaded by
Yetiv's challenges to the sufficiency of evidence because the
AU relied on Yetiv's own admissions to base his decision.
Those admissions constituted substantial evidence.
HOLDING: The administrative decision imposing civil
penalties was affirmed.
IMPACT: Even when a totality of circumstances test
includes factors that are not necessarily logically related to a
violation, the decision is not considered arbitrary and
capricious so long as the administrative law judge carefully
analyses factors that do logically relate to base the decision.
Spring 2008 Legal Summaries
384 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-1
Lin2enfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007).
LAW: An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for
finding a lack of credibility in claimant testimony.
FACTS: After Plaintiffs application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income was denied initially
and upon consideration, he requested a hearing before and
Administrative Law Judge ("AL"). At the hearing, the
Plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified on his own
behalf. There were multiple medical reports from many
doctors presented, but there was no consensus on Plaintiffs
level of disability. The ALJ also denied benefits. In denying
the benefits, the ALJ applied a five-step disability evaluation
process, which the Plaintiff passed except for where the
residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment in step four
and five. The ALJ found that the Plaintiff retained the
capacity to lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds
frequently and could stand and/or walk for at least two hours.
The Plaintiff testified to additional limitations that would
establish a lower RFC, the ALJ rejected the testimony as not
totally credible. The ALJ provided two reasons for the adverse
credibility finding. Based on the RFC assessment and a
vocational expert testimony, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff
was not able to perform past relevant work, but retained the
capacity to perform other work that existed in the economy.
The Appeals Council adopted the ALJ's decision as the final
decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed complaint in
district court, which issued an order and judgment adopting the
report and recommendation of a magistrate judge and
affirming the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff appealed.
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed de novo and acknowledged
that they may set aside the denial of benefits when the denial is
not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal
error. The Plaintiff argued that substantial evidence does not
support the decision because the ALJ improperly rejected his
testimony as to the severity of his pain and symptoms. The
court agreed with the Plaintiff and reasoned that the AU failed
to provide clear and convincing reasons for not finding
credibility in Plaintiffs testimony and should have included
the testified limitations in the RFC assessment. The court
stated that the AU must engage in a two-step analysis to
determine credibility of Plaintiffs testimony regarding
subjective pain or symptoms. First, the AU must determine
whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence
of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected
to produce the pain or symptoms alleged. It is not necessary
that the claimant show evidence to support the severity of the
pain or symptom. If the claimant meets the first step, the ALJ
can reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the
symptoms only by offering clear and convincing reasons for
doing so. The ALJ reasoned that there was a consensus of
medical opinion that Plaintiff retained the capacity for
sedentary work and that a brief nine-week stint of work was
inconsistent with the alleged severity of his symptoms. The
court did not accept the two reasons provided by the ALJ
because there was not consensus of the medical opinion and
the nine-week work attempt was not a sufficient basis in and of
itself for an adverse credibility finding.
The court also rejected the ALJ's finding that there were
sufficient jobs based on the vocational expert testimony
because these jobs do not exist for a person with the
limitations testified to by the Plaintiff.
HOLDING: The district court's judgment was reversed with
instructions to remand to the ALT for the calculation and
award of appropriate benefits.
IMPACT: In benefit denial cases, the reviewing court will
look for clear and convincing reasons for a finding that the
claimant lacks credibility.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS - FIFTH CIRUIT
Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv. Agency, 504 F.3d 592
(5th Cir. 2007).
LAW: 7 U.S.C. Section 6912(e) is not a jurisdictional rule but
the codification of a judicially developed principle under
which exhaustion of administrative remedies is favored, but
may be excused by a federal court under a limited number of
exceptions.
FACTS: Dawson Farms, LLC ("Dawson"), a farm operator
brought suit in district court against the Farm Service Agency
("FSA"), other agencies in the Department of Agriculture
("USDA"), and the Corps of Engineers. Dawson sought
declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. Dawson
alleged that the FSA erroneously determined that Dawson
must return USDA program benefits and intended to withhold
future benefits because of Dawson's wetlands violations of the
"swampbuster" provisions of the Food Security Act.
The District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Dawson had not exhausted its
administrative remedies. Dawson appealed.
ANALYSIS: Defendant-appellees argue that §6912(e)
jurisdictionally bars any action or appeal in a federal court
against the Secretary or his delegate by a person who has not
exhausted all administrative appeal procedures. Dawson
argues that even if it failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and should
have excused it from exhaustion under the circumstances in
this case. The court stated that it is possible for a party to
bring an action without exhaustion and invoke federal
jurisdiction in exceptional and extenuating circumstances, but
that Dawson had failed to establish that it should be excused
from the exhaustion requirement and the court rejected their
"futile" argument.
The court reviewed the jurisdictional splits among the circuits
as to whether §6912(e) was a jurisdictional or jurisprudential
requirement for the exhaustion of remedies. Ultimately the
court sided with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits because one
important factor in deciding whether exhaustion is "textually
required" or "statutorily mandated" is when the statute
explicitly mentions and deprives federal courts of jurisdiction
if administrative remedies are not exhausted. Section 6912(e)
does not have this language and therefore it is the codification
of jurisprudential doctrine and not jurisdictional. Because
Dawson failed to exhaust all of its administrative remedies and
no excuse or exception has been shown, summary judgment in
favor of the defendants was appropriate. The court also noted
that failure to exhaust administrative remedies usually results
in a dismissal without prejudice, when exhaustion is no longer
possible, dismissal may be with prejudice. The exhaustion of
administrative remedies is too late for the claims in this case.
HOLDING: The District Court's judgment dismissing the
case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was
affirmed, with prejudice.
IMPACT: Under §6912(e) a federal court will have
jurisdiction over a claim that has not been administratively
exhausted if the claimant has a valid excuse or exception.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS - DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Spirit of the Sage Council v. Kempthorne, 511 F. Supp. 2d
31 (D.C. 2007).
LAW: Under the Permit Revocation Rule of the Endangered
Species Act, an Incidental Take Permit will be revoked when
continuation of the permit puts the list species is in jeopardy of
extinction.
FACTS: Plaintiffs brought an action challenging the validity
of two federal rules, the No Surprises Rule and the Permit
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Revocation Rule ("PRR", collectively, "the Rules"), under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The PRR amended
regulations specifically applicable to Incidental Take Permits
("ITP"), which were available to landowners, and developers
who agree to mitigate the impacts to listed endangered species
through a Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP"). In effect, the
PRR specifies that an ITP will not be revoked unless
continuation of the permit puts a listed species in jeopardy of
extinction. This significantly narrowed the circumstances
under which an ITP would be revoked. Additionally, permits
would be granted even if doing so threatened the recovery of
an endangered species.
The court ruled that PRR had been promulgated without
adequate opportunity for public comment required by the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and remanded the
Rules to the Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service (collectively, "the Services") to complete the
proceedings within one year and enjoined use of the Rules in
the interim. The Services complied with the required
procedures and re-promulgated PRR. Pending before the court
were cross-Motions for Summary Judgment disputing the
court's jurisdiction and the Plaintiff's claims under the APA.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the Defendants argument that
the Plaintiffs lacked standing because they must challenge a
specific ITP and that their harm was purely speculative. It
reasoned that Plaintiffs assertion of harm arising from the
substantial and unprecedented increase in ITPs sought and
issued was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact and therefore
Plaintiffs had standing. The court also found the Plaintiff's
claims ripe for review because they are facial challenges to
regulations that have a direct and immediate effect on the
Services and regulated third parties.
Plaintiffs argued that the PRR is contrary to the ESA and is not
in accordance with the law under the APA. The court applied
the framework established by Chevron to determine whether
the action was in accordance with the law within the meaning
of that provision. The Plaintiff's argue that section 10 requires
measures that insure the survival and recovery of listed
species. The section requires parties seeking an ITP to submit
a HCP and because "conservation" is a broader concept than
mere survival, the holders of the ITP must necessarily be
required to "conserve" species and ITPs should be revoked
when the recovery of a species is imperiled. The court
rejected this argument because more specific provisions of
section 10 fatally undermine it by speaking to minimizing
impact on species, but do not address the recovery of species.
Additionally, section 10 contains a specific provision
regarding the revocation or permits and doesn't require
revocation due to the threat to a species' recovery. The court
also rejected the Plaintiffs argument that a recovery-based
standard must be applied to ITPs due to a recent Ninth Circuit
decision because it was distinguishable.
In analyzing whether the rules were based on a permissible
construction of the statute, the court referenced Congressional
intent to allow the Services to grant ITPs even if they do not
protect the recovery of listed species. Moreover, the PRR
adopts a facially reasonable policy for revocation. Therefore,
the court concluded that the PRR is a permissible and
reasonable construction of the ESA. The court also rejected
Plaintiffs argument that the No Surprises Rule is contrary to
the ESA because it makes more permanent conditions in an
ITP that may not promote or maintain the recovery of listed
species. It reasoned that the ESA does not require ITPs to
promote or maintain the recovery of species.
Plaintiffs also argue that the Rules are arbitrary and capricious
because the Services failed to articulate a reasoned basis for
the rules. The court rejected this argument because if
concluded that the Services have clearly explained that they
believe that matching the ITP revocation criteria to the
statutory ITP issuance criteria more accurately reflected
Congressional intent. The court also rejected the Plaintiffs
argument that the Services have failed to explain why the
PRR's standard for revocation of ITPs was drafted in
discretionary rather than mandatory terms. The court found it
rational for the PRR to be phrased in discretionary terms
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because decisions are fact-intensive and require the agency to
exercise discretion. The court also rejected Plaintiffs
argument that the No Surprises Rule's justification of creating
incentives for landowners to engage in conservation was
inconsistent with the ESA because it was rational for the
Services to follow Congressional intent and create incentives
for private landowners to apply and utilize ITPs. Lastly, the
court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that an ITP holder
should be required to address foreseeable changes in
circumstances if those circumstances were not addressed at the
time of the ITP issuance. The court acknowledged that these
types of circumstances are addressed in the HCP and if
applicants fail to address foreseeable circumstances, the
Services can deny the ITP application. Therefore, the Services
can handle the Plaintiffs concern under the Rules. The court
concluded that the Rules are not arbitrary and capricious under
the APA.
HOLDING: Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was
denied and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was granted.
IMPACT: The reasons for revocation of Incidental Take
Permits are narrow. This means that once a permit is issued, it
will not be revoked based on threats to the listed species,
rather the listed species must be in jeopardy of extinction.
There are no requirements to actively conserve, rather to
minimize impact on the listed species.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
Valenzuela v. Cal. State Pers. Bd., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529 (Ct.
App. 2007)
LAW: Without adequate notice, dismissal as a penalty for
failing a drug test is an abuse of discretion of the State
Personnel Board.
FACTS: Petitioner was a corrections officer for the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department).
Petitioner received a prescription for weight loss from a
Mexican doctor. Because he was subject to drug testing as an
employee of the Department, Petitioner confirmed with the
doctor that the diet pills would not cause him any trouble.
Two days after taking the medication, the Petitioner was
randomly selected to participate in drug testing and the results
came beck positive for Amphetamine. The medical review
officer who reviewed the drug tests was told by the Petitioner
that he was taking Mexican diet pills and sent him a copy of a
letter from the Mexican doctor stating that the medication was
a legitimate weight loss treatment. After a hearing, the warden
of the prison where Petitioner worked decided that dismissal
was the proper penalty.
Petitioner appealed to the State Personnel Board (Board), who
upheld the penalty. Petitioner then filed for writ of
administrative mandate requesting the superior court to vacate
the Board's order. The trial court found that the Board had
abused its discretion because there was no evidence to support
a conclusion that the Petitioner was on legally adequate notice
that his foreign prescription could result in him being tested
positive for amphetamines. The trial court ordered the
Petitioner to be reinstated with back pay. The Department
appealed.
ANALYSIS: The Appellant contended that the Petitioner did
have adequate legal notice because of employees were told in
the 2000-2001 timeframe that Mexican medicines could be
metabolized into amphetamines and caused drug testing
concerns. Another memo was sent out in 2000 regarding
Mexican diet pills and repeated information from the previous
memo. The copies of the memos in the record did not have
any letterhead or other information indicating their distribution
or source. This was problematic for the court because both the
content and the format of the notice were proven only to a
speculative degree and there was no established policy of
notifying employees of the exact nature of the prohibited
conduct. For these reasons, the court did not find that the
Department had proven with substantial evidence that
employees or Petitioner in particular, had been placed on
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constructive or actual notice. The dismissal could not be
upheld on those grounds.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment reinstating Petitioner
with back pay was affirmed.
IMPACT: Terminations based on an employee receiving
legally adequate notice of prohibited conduct, must be proven
with substantial evidence. An example of this is an established
policy on disseminating information to employees which
provides notice of prohibited conduct. If substantial evidence
of legally adequate notice is not presented, the Board cannot
uphold this termination or it will be vacated as an abuse of
discretion.
Park v. Valverde, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895 (Ct. App. 2007)
LAW: The exclusionary rule does not apply in DMV
Administrative license suspension proceedings.
FACTS: A police officer observed Park operating a motor
vehicle. When the officer ran a license plate check on the
vehicle, the information obtained in the check was based on
outdated police records and indicated that the vehicle could be
stolen. During the stop, the erroneous record check was
corrected, but the officer noticed that Park appeared
intoxicated. Park failed a field sobriety test and admitted he
had been drinking. The subsequent breathalyzer test showed a
blood-alcohol level of 0.12 percent. The officer issued Park an
administrative per se suspension/revocation order and
temporary driver's license.
In the subsequent criminal proceedings, Park moved to
suppress all evidence obtained or seized in connection with the
traffic stop, because the stop was based on outdated police
information. The court dismissed the action against Park. In
the subsequent DMV administrative review of Park's driving
privileges, Park again asserted that the exclusionary rule
should apply. The DMV did consider the evidence and
suspended Park's driver's license for one year. Park then filed
a petition for a writ of mandate and the court denied the writ
petition. Park appealed.
ANALYSIS: In considering whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied in DMV administrative hearings, the court
reviewed the purpose of the rule which is to deter police
misconduct. The court noted that the exclusionary rule has
long been a part of constitutional procedural due process in
criminal cases but that it is rarely applied in civil cases in the
absence of statutory authorization.
The court discussed the need for the per se statutes authorizing
suspension because the legal process leading to the imposition
of a suspension sometimes took years from the time of the
arrest. The per se statutes expedite the driver's license
suspension system to make the suspension process swift. The
criminal and administrative proceedings are intended to
operate independently of each other and to provide for
different dispositions.
The court also referenced cases where there were both criminal
and subsequent administrative proceedings. Both in a parole
adult authority proceeding and a state bar proceeding, the
courts found the societal interests greater than the interest in
police misconduct deterrence and therefore the exclusionary
rule did not apply in the administrative proceedings. Lastly,
the court applied a balancing test between the competing
interests. The responsibility of the DMV to get drunk drivers
off the road for protection of society at large outweighed the
interest in deterring law enforcement officials from
maintaining inaccurate stolen vehicle information.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment that the exclusionary
rule does not apply in DMV administrative license suspension
proceedings was affirmed.
IMPACT: This holding confirms that administrative
proceedings allow evidence that would otherwise be excluded
because of the exclusionary rule. Evidence that may have
been excluded in a criminal proceeding most likely will not be
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excluded in a subsequent administrative proceeding.
Specifically, in DMV license suspension proceedings, the
interest in public safety is greater than the interest in police
misconduct deterrence and therefore the exclusionary rule does
not apply.
TEXAS STATE COURT
In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 235 S.W.3d 619
(Tex. 2007).
LAW: Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct a trial
court's denial of a plea to jurisdiction when there is exclusive
jurisdiction in an agency.
FACTS: In 1995, amendments to the Public Utility
Regulatory Act ("PURA") and the federal
Telecommunications Act on 1996 opened local exchange
service to competition. The amendments also provided for
incentive regulation which permitted local telephone carriers
to opt out of the traditional regulatory framework if they
agreed to cap, or freeze, rates for basic services, including
switched access rates. In response to these amendments, the
Public Utilities Commission ("PUC") promulgated a rule
allowing providers to recover their portion of the Texas
Universal Service Fund ("TUSF") from retail customers via a
Texas Universal Service Surcharge, which was a percentage of
the customer's bill.
Customers challenged Southwestern Bell Telephone's
("SWBT") TUSF charge for the basic services in light of the
rate freeze agreement. A class action was filed in County
District Court and SWBT filed a plea to the jurisdiction,
arguing that PUC has exclusive jurisdiction over the core
claims, and the trial court denied it. The court of appeals
denied mandamus relief. SWBT then sought a writ of
mandamus from the Supreme Court of Texas.
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that mandamus relief is an
extraordinary remedy to be used only when a court has clearly
abused its discretion, but that the trial court had abused its
discretion by denying the plea to the jurisdiction. The court
noted that the judicial appropriation of state agency authority
would be a clear disruption of the orderly processes of
government.
The court rejected the Plaintiff's argument that the PUC does
not have jurisdiction because it cannot grant the relief they
request as it discussed how the Legislature specifically granted
the PUC exclusive original jurisdiction over the business and
property of a telecommunications utility. When an agency has
exclusive jurisdiction, a party must first exhaust administrative
remedies before a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction.
The court also discussed how SWBT's jurisdictional plea was
limited to the core claims and not to any new claims asserted
after the jurisdictional plea.
HOLDING: The Supreme Court held that PUC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the core claims and the trial court abused its
discretion in denting SWBT's jurisdictional plea. The writ of
mandamus was conditionally granted as to those claims and
the trial court was directed to: vacated its January 6, 2004
order denying SWBT's motion to dismiss, to dismiss the core
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and to conduct
proceedings consistent with the opinion.
IMPACT: The Texas Supreme Court establishes that denial
of a plea of jurisdiction in regards to an agency with exclusive
jurisdiction is an abuse of discretion. This abuse therefore
makes mandamus an appropriate remedy.
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